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Over his prolific career, Joshua Dressler has authored many important works 
devoted to criminal defenses.  Among those is one of the most nuanced and 
compelling accounts of the defense of duress developed in his Exegesis of the Law 
of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its Proper Limits1 and other 
articles.2  Today, these works are classics, and yet, as is so typical of Dressler’s 
scholarship, they have not lost their provocative appeal.  Like when they were first 
published, they invite dialogue, debate, and further exploration.  In this article, I 
gratefully accept this invitation as I strive to find my own answers to some of the 
tantalizing questions raised by Dressler. 
“Our society has a love-hate relationship with the criminal law defense of 
duress,”3 says Dressler, and I could not agree more.  Although firmly established,4 
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1   Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its 
Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331 (1989) [hereinafter Exegesis of the Law of Duress]. 
2   Joshua Dressler, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the 
Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671 (1988) [hereinafter Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers]; 
Joshua Dressler, Reflections on Dudley and Stephens and Killing the Innocent: Taking a Wrong 
Conceptual Path, in THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: THE LEGACY OF GLANVILLE 
WILLIAMS 126 (Dennis J. Baker & Jeremy Horder eds., 2013) [hereinafter Reflections on Dudley and 
Stephens]; Joshua Dressler, Some Very Modest Reflections on Excusing Criminal Wrongdoers, 42 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 247 (2009); Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in 
the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher’s Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61 (1984) 
[hereinafter New Thoughts]; Joshua Dressler, Duress, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 269 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 2011). 
3   Exegesis of the Law of Duress, supra note 1, at 1331. 
4   As developed under the common law, the defense provides: 
A person who does an act specified for an offence with the fault required for commission 
of that offence, nevertheless does not commit the offence if he does the act because (as he 
knows or believes) another person has threatened that he or a third person will suffer 
death or serious injury if he does not do the act, and the threat is one which in the 
circumstances he cannot reasonably be expected to resist; which he has not knowingly 
courted; and the carrying out of which he cannot otherwise avoid. 
LAW COMM’N, LEGISLATING THE CRIMINAL CODE: OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON AND GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 218, 48 (1993). 
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this defense has not had an easy ride in criminal law.5  It has been severely 
criticized by authorities,6 narrowly construed by judges, and rarely invoked with 
success by defendants.7  Despite all that, “our society has retained the defense, 
expanded it over the years, and paid close attention to the calls of those who would 
apply the defense in novel ways.”8 
Our ambivalence over the defense largely stems from our conflicting feelings 
toward the defendant.  Who is he—a victim or a victimizer—and how shall we 
treat him?9  We are torn between empathizing with his plight as a target of 
unlawful coercion, on the one hand, and despising his choice to commit a crime 
rather than withstand the threat, on the other. 
Sometimes, our moral intuitions fall strongly on the side of the defendant.  
That happens when his criminal conduct is not as serious as the imminent harm 
with which he has been threatened.  In those circumstances, we believe that the 
defendant’s choice was justified: if his life was truly in danger, it was better to go 
along with the criminal demand and, say, make a false insurance claim rather than 
be killed.10  This choice is essentially the same as the paradigmatic justified choice 
of the mountaineers who, under the threat of an upcoming deadly snowstorm, 
break into a vacant cabin, spend the night there, and consume the owner’s 
provisions.11  Who would blame them? 
Not only should we exculpate those unfortunate folks, but we should also 
send a clear message to the community: it is permissible to break the law (commit 
a fraud, burglary, or theft) if doing so is necessary to avoid a greater harm or evil.  
In line with that, the Model Penal Code (“MPC”) and numerous state penal codes 
allow the defendant to plead the defense of necessity both to human and natural 
threats.12  So, conceptually, a claim of duress plays only a secondary role when the 
defendant’s conduct has resulted in a desirable balance of harms and evils.13 
                                                                                                                                      
5   See, e.g., R v Brown [1968] SASR 467, 479 (Austrl.) (describing duress as a defense “as to 
which there is little direct authority and much theoretical discussion.”). 
6   See, e.g., 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 51 (London, T. 
Payne et al. 1778) (“[I]f a man be desperately assaulted, and in peril of death, and cannot otherwise 
escape, unless to satisfy his assailant’s fury he will kill an innocent person then present, the fear and 
actual force will not acquit him of the crime and punishment of murder, if he commit the fact; for he 
ought rather to die himself, than kill an innocent . . . .”). 
7   Exegesis of the Law of Duress, supra note 1, at 1332. 
8   Id. (footnotes omitted). 
9   Id. (“In a world that often seeks to avoid moral ambiguity by finding victims and villains, it 
is unclear which appellation more fairly describes a person who accedes to an unlawful threat.”). 
10  See State v. Toscano, 378 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1977) (reversing conviction of conspiracy to 
obtain money by false pretenses where there was evidence that defendant committed the crime 
because he and his wife were threatened with violence). 
11  MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1985). 
12  See id. § 3.02(1)(a).  See also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7–13 (2017) (not restricting the 
source of necessity).  This is a departure from the common law rule, which allowed the defense of 
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It is when we cannot fall back on other defenses and need to evaluate 
independently the moral quality of a harmful self-preferential choice that the real 
challenge of duress comes into focus.  Considering that this defense is usually 
available only to the defendants who were exposed to a threat of death or serious 
bodily harm14 (or such bodily harm that a person of reasonable firmness would not 
be able to resist),15 it follows that those who have to rely on duress did something 
truly horrible—injured, raped, or killed innocent people—to avert a similar or 
lesser harm from themselves. 
The Australian case of Bulent Topcu and Christovalantis Papadopoulos may 
serve as an example.16  The two men raped a girl following the orders of their 
friend and leader, Canan Eken.  Topcu and Papadopoulos claimed that they were 
afraid to be hurt by Eken who had gone “berserk” on the night of the attack, 
kicking, hitting, and beating the girl and trashing the apartment in a drug-induced 
rage.17  “I saw [Eken’s] knife.  I didn’t want to get stabbed again.  I nearly died 
once.  I just wanted the whole thing to be over.  I couldn’t move from my seat.  I 
couldn’t do nothing.  I couldn’t stop it.  I was too scared,”18 testified Topcu.  “I 
                                                                                                                                                   
necessity only in cases of natural emergencies.  See, e.g., R. Kent Greenawalt, Violence—Legal 
Justification and Moral Appraisal, 32 EMORY L.J. 437, 443 n.11 (1983) (noting that the common law 
necessity defense required the harm to be caused by natural, not man made, forces). 
13  See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09, cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985). 
The problem of Section 2.09 [duress], then, reduces to the question of whether there are 
cases where the actor cannot justify his conduct under Section 3.02 [choice of evils], as 
when his choice involves an equal or greater evil than that threatened, but where he 
nonetheless should be excused because he was subjected to coercion. 
See George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 958 (1985) (“The 
analysis of justification must precede the analysis of excuse.”).  But see Douglas Husak, On the 
Supposed Priority of Justification to Excuse, 24 LAW & PHIL. 557 (2005) (critiquing this view). 
14  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26 (2017) (defense applicable to crimes other than murder 
if the actor “reasonably believes that performing the act is the only way to prevent his imminent death 
or great bodily injury”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5206(a) (2018) (defense applicable to crimes other 
than murder or voluntary manslaughter if the actor “reasonably believes that death or great bodily 
harm will be inflicted upon such person or upon such person’s spouse, parent, child, brother or sister 
if such person does not perform such conduct”).  See also United States v. Kilgore, 591 F.3d 890, 893 
(7th Cir. 2010) (to prevail, the “defendant must ordinarily establish that he faced an imminent threat 
of serious bodily injury or death . . .”). 
15  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1985) (“It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an 
offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his 
person or the person of another, that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been 
unable to resist.”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.00 (2017). 
16  Papadopoulos v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 274 (Austl.). 
17  When Duress Is No Argument for Rape, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Feb. 20, 2006), 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/when-duress-is-no-argument-for-rape/2006/02/19/114028394
9222.html [https://perma.cc/XN99-5BS6]. 
18  Id. 
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obeyed him because of the way he was acting before and the way he was 
screaming.  He seemed to have something in his hand when he pointed,” pleaded 
Papadopoulos.19 
The jury was not persuaded by Topcu’s and Papadopoulos’s claims of duress 
and both defendants were convicted of gang rape; however, their initial lengthier 
prison terms were later reduced to three and a half years for Topcu and two years 
for Papadopoulos.20  The appellate judge writing for the majority commented that 
their crime was “to a large degree the product of weakness rather than the 
criminality and unqualified abuse of power commonly involved in rape.”21  The 
dissenting judge disagreed: “In my opinion, notwithstanding the fact that both 
Topcu and Papadopoulos became caught up in events for which they were not 
initially responsible, the circumstances of this offence require a sentence which 
adequately marks its seriousness.”22 
In this case, the claim of duress did not exonerate the offenders; instead 
(rightly or wrongly), it ended up mitigating their sentences.  Yet, even in that 
capacity, it caused a principled disagreement between the judges.  That 
disagreement, reflective of our moral uncertainty about duress, underscores the 
essential question with which we struggle: does the natural human fear of pain and 
death present such a powerful moral argument as to overcome all the deontological 
moral taboos and completely relieve the actor of responsibility for doing horrible 
things to innocent people? 
Analytically, the answer to this question depends at least on three premises—
whether duress is: (i) a normative defense based on the defendant’s “just desert”; 
(ii) a defense of excuse; and (iii) a complete defense.  If all three premises are 
affirmative, then yes, any kind and amount of harm is excusable. 
On its face, Dressler’s account of duress is based on such affirmative 
premises.  For Dressler, duress is: 
 
- a normative claim for exculpation grounded in “just desert”23 (and not 
an expression of compassion for the defendant; positive evaluation of 
the defendant’s character; or concession to the fact that most people 
would have behaved the way the defendant did);24 
                                                                                                                                      
19  Id. 
20  Jennifer Cooke, Gang Rapists’ Sentences Slashed, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 12, 
2007, 12:37 PM), http://www.smh.com.au/news/general/gang-rapists-sentences-slashed/2007/09/12/
1189276775306.html [https://perma.cc/69TE-UKB9]. 
21  Id. 
22  Id. 
23  Exegesis of the Law of Duress, supra note 1, at 1371 (noting in the same article “I am 
presenting a retributive rather than utilitarian explanation of excuses.  As is now commonly accepted 
by nearly all but the most die-hard utilitarians, deterrence theory does not adequately explain the 
existence of excuses in the criminal law”).  Id. at 1357 n.155. 
24  Id. at 1385. 
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- a defense of excuse based on the limited choice available to the 
defendant, namely his lack of a fair opportunity to avoid acting 
unlawfully;25 and 
- a complete defense, available in prosecution for any crime.26 
 
At a closer look, however, Dressler’s account is more complex and less 
consistent.  Even though Dressler identifies duress as an excuse, he adds to his test 
of duress features that are foreign to the excuse theory, specifically, a balancing 
component and a normative threshold of moral strength.  To determine whether a 
person should be entitled to the defense, Dressler asks “whether, in light of the 
nature of the demand and the expected repercussions from noncompliance, we 
could fairly expect a person of nonsaintly moral strength to resist the threat.”27  
The first italicized passage represents a balancing test that weighs the harmfulness 
of the threat against that of the demand; the second adds to the test an objective 
normative threshold of moral strength.  These two features allow Dressler to avoid 
the morally problematic result of excusing the “inexcusable,” but they also 
significantly weaken Dressler’s characterization of duress as an excuse.  Balancing 
tests belong to the theory of justifications, not excuses, and so do objective 
standards of permissible conduct.  Dressler correctly intuited these non-excusatory 
elements of duress but he did not follow his intuition to assign to duress a proper 
place among criminal law defenses. 
Before I proceed with my argument, I would like to list some foundational 
issues on which I agree with Dressler.  First and foremost, I agree that duress is a 
normative claim based on the defendant’s limited free choice.  Like Dressler,28 I 
approach this defense from the perspective of “just desert.”  I agree that balancing 
“the nature of the demand and the expected repercussions from noncompliance” is 
an inherent part of the duress analysis.  I also agree that duress has an excusatory 
component.  For me, it is not the “lack of a fair opportunity” but instead a 
significant volitional impairment caused by violation of the defendant’s autonomy 
that affects the defendant’s power to act in accordance with his long-term goals 
and values.  Nevertheless, I agree that duress may not be interpreted adequately 
without an excusatory rationale. 
In addition, at least for the purposes of this article, I follow Dressler in 
accepting certain traditional requirements of the defense of duress, such as the 
                                                                                                                                      
25  Id.  Dressler concludes that: 
[T]he defense [of duress] must be based on the normative claim that the actor lacked a 
fair opportunity to avoid acting unlawfully.  Such an opportunity is lacking if a person of 
reasonable moral strength cannot fairly be expected to resist the threat.  So understood, 
duress is at once a fascinating and very troubling excuse . . . . 
Id. 
26  Dressler approves of the MPC’s position that allows duress to be pleaded as a defense to 
any crime, including murder.  Id. at 1334, 1344, 1370–74. 
27  Id. at 1367 (emphasis added) (emphasis omitted). 
28  Id. at 1371; see id. at 1357 n.155, 1367, 1371 n.212 and the surrounding text. 
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requirement that (i) the threat to the actor be of physical harm; and (ii) the actor 
lack subjective culpability in putting himself in a situation of vulnerability to 
coercion.  Like Dressler, I primarily consider such intentional acts that brought 
about the same or higher amount of harm than that with which the actor has been 
threatened.29 
My disagreement with Dressler involves four issues: 
 
1. the character of the defense of duress—I do not think that it is merely 
an excuse; 
2. the meaning of duress—I am not persuaded by Dressler’s no-fair-
opportunity theory; 
3. the effect of duress—I argue that it should warrant a partial defense 
only; and 
4. the need for this defense—I wonder whether there is an independent 
useful place for it in criminal law. 
 
In what follows, I address these points of disagreement and certain related 
issues.  I start with discussing how duress differs from all other excuses in its 
moral foundation and legal boundaries. 
 
I. THE CHARACTER OF THE DEFENSE OF DURESS 
 
A. Duress v. Other Excuses: The Issue of Blame 
 
According to Dressler and the majority of scholars who have written about 
duress, duress is an excuse.30  It is an excuse because, like other excuses, it is a 
                                                                                                                                      
29  I leave for another day the questions of whether there is an important moral difference 
between committing a wrongdoing in order to avoid a human threat compared to a natural emergency 
and whether duress should be a “sliding scale” defense available to a defendant threatened with any 
(including non-physical) harm—for example, as when the actor, threatened with property destruction, 
follows the coercer’s demand and causes the same or more serious property damage to another. 
30  See, e.g., Exegesis of the Law of Duress, supra note 1, at 1365–67; GEORGE P. FLETCHER, 
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 830 (1978) (describing duress as “a paradigmatic example of an 
excuse”); Kyron Huigens, Duress Is Not a Justification, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 303 (2004).  Duress 
has been described as justification by scholars who view it as a species of the choice-of-evils defense.  
See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 433 (2d ed. 1986) (“it is better 
that the defendant, faced with a choice of evils, choose to do the lesser evil . . . in order to avoid the 
greater evil threatened by the other person.”).  Duress has also been described as an agent-relative 
justification.  See, e.g., ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 165–69 (Marshall Cohen ed. 1987); Larry 
Alexander, A Unified Excuse of Preemptive Self-Protection, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1475, 1487 
(1999) (suggesting that duress may be interpreted as a “‘personal justification’—a justification that 
only he, not third parties, can claim, and that does not preclude resistance by his victims.”).  Finally, a 
creative argument has been made that duress is a justification on the theory that its characteristics as 
an unlawful, man-made, and purposely coercive threat “combine to affect the magnitude that 
threatened harms possess for purposes of the choice-of-evils defense.”  Peter Westen & James 
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defense to a wrongful act committed by a non-responsible actor.31  To determine 
whether this classification is accurate, it may be worthwhile to look more closely at 
how particular excuses render actors non-responsible and see whether duress fits in 
the same paradigm. 
The most noncontroversial example of non-responsibility is the lack of 
capacity.  Among such defenses are insanity, extreme minority, and involuntary 
intoxication.32  In all those circumstances, actors essentially lack moral agency; 
due to a volitional or cognitive impairment, they are powerless to choose such 
course of actions that would increase their chances of not breaking the law.  
Accordingly, it would be patently unfair to blame them for the wrongdoing that 
they were incapable of avoiding.33 
A mistake, even a reasonable mistake, is usually treated as an excuse too.34  
What puts it in that category is the cognitive impairment that takes away the 
actor’s ability to make the right choices and not break the law.  At the same time, a 
reasonable mistake is different from the incapacity excuses in that it encompasses 
morally appropriate conduct.  Quoting Dressler, “[a] society realistically cannot 
ask more of people than to act in conformity with reasonable appearances.”35  This 
logic has led some scholars to classify reasonable mistake as a justification.36  
                                                                                                                                                   
Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress: A Justification, Not an Excuse—And Why It Matters, 6 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 836 (2003). 
31  J. L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 1, 2 (1957) (by pleading 
justification for an act, “we accept responsibility but deny that it was bad”; by pleading excuse, “we 
admit that it was bad but don’t accept full, or even any, responsibility.”). 
32  See Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers, supra note 2, at 702. 
33  See Exegesis of the Law of Duress, supra note 1, at 1357–58. 
34  See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 30, at 696–97, 762–69 (arguing that even a reasonable 
mistake regarding the presence of justifying conditions negates justification); Paul H. Robinson, 
Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 239–40 (1982) (arguing that 
mistaken self-defense should be treated as an excuse rather than a justification); Alexander, supra 
note 30 at 1483–84 (supporting Robinson’s view). 
35  New Thoughts, supra note 2, at 93. 
36  See, e.g., id. at 92–95 (critiquing Fletcher’s theory of justification and excuse for, among 
other things, denying justification to a reasonably mistaken actor); Kent Greenawalt, Distinguishing 
Justifications from Excuses, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 102 (1986) (arguing that “the actor’s 
blameless perception of the facts ought to be sufficient to support a justification.”).  Many penal 
codes do not distinguish between putative (due to a reasonable mistake) and true (resulting in a better 
balance of evils) justifications.  See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft 
and Revised Comments 1985); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and 
Revised Comments 1985); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(1) (2017) (justifying use of “physical force upon 
another person when and to the extent [the actor] reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend 
himself, herself or a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent 
use of unlawful physical force by such other person).  See also SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. 
SCHULHOFER & RACHEL E. BARKOW, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 871 
(10th ed. 2017) (observing that a reasonably mistaken self-defense should properly be characterized 
as excused rather than justified but “courts and commentators conventionally refer to self-defense in 
both settings as a justification”). 
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Under this approach, a person would be justified if he shoots and kills an 
unoffending bystander pursuant to a mistaken but reasonable belief that the 
bystander was about to shoot him first.  At least in some of his works, Dressler has 
been sympathetic to this view too.37  For example, in his critique of George 
Fletcher’s theory of justifications, Dressler posed a hypothetical: 
 
Suppose undercover police officer, P.O., has probable cause to arrest X 
for a mass murder.  Understandably, P.O. pulls a gun on X.  Before P.O. 
can announce her identity, X, believing her life is in jeopardy, attempts 
to defend herself by killing P.O.  X was not the mass murderer, nor was 
she guilty of any crime.  How do we handle the resultant homicide?  In 
one sense we have mutual mistakes.  P.O. is mistaken in thinking that X 
is a dangerous criminal; X is mistaken about P.O.’s identity and therefore 
is mistaken about P.O.’s intentions.  Our intuition may tell us that P.O. is 
justified—P.O. acted rightfully.  Indeed, we usually justify a police 
officer’s conduct if it is based on probable cause.  What about X? . . .  Do 
we not—or, at least, can we not—believe, however, that X is right to 
protect herself? 38 
 
I think we should not believe so.  P.O.’s and X’s circumstances are very different: 
P.O., being a public official, acts under the public duty defense;39 X acts under 
self-defense.  The former defense is a “right,” the latter is merely a “privilege”; and 
in a conflict between a right and a privilege, the former should have priority.40  
Furthermore, the fact that X is not a mass murderer is irrelevant for P.O.’s 
justification; P.O. has the probable cause to arrest X and use of a gun in the course 
of the arrest (he is not mistaken about that) and that is all that matters to justify 
P.O.’s actions.  Whereas P.O.’s justification requires him to be right only about the 
probable cause, X’s justification requires him to be right about the deadly threat to 
which he is exposed—and she is not.  Accordingly, P.O. is right and X is wrong.  
True, if X’s mistake is reasonable, we would not blame her—through no fault of 
hers, she is not a responsible moral agent—just like we do not blame young 
children and the insane for the wrongdoings they commit.  A reasonably mistaken 
                                                                                                                                      
37  Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the 
Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155 (1987); New Thoughts, supra note 2, at 93.  In his other work, 
however, Fletcher referred to mistakes as excuses.  See Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers, supra 
note 2, at 702 (characterizing mistake not induced by mental illness or some other disabling condition 
as a no-fair-opportunity excuses). 
38  New Thoughts, supra note 2, at 94 (footnote omitted). 
39  The public duty defense is available to a person acting either under an official capacity (a 
public servant), or court order, or a duty or authority to assist or act on behalf of a public officer.  
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 534–36, 558–59, 565–66 (4th ed. 2003). 
40  Vera Bergelson, Rights, Wrongs, and Comparative Justifications, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2481, 2488 (2007).  See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS 
APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 35–50 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923). 
2018] DURESS IS NO EXCUSE 403 
 
actor is excused and free from blame. 
How does duress fit into this paradigm?  Is a person who committed a crime 
under duress as blameless as a person who is legally insane or reasonably 
mistaken?  An argument could be made that he is: due to a serious volitional 
impairment, his ability to choose a non-criminal course of action was diminished. 
This is a straightforward excusatory argument.  And yet, the coerced actor 
differs dramatically from other excused actors.  He is a moral agent, capable of 
understanding his choices and acting on those choices.  Unlike an insane or 
mistaken actor, he has the capacity not to break the law but, under the 
circumstances, he finds it preferable to break it.41  His disabilities, compared to 
other excused actors, are, at best, partial.  Considering all that, it seems fair to 
blame the actor who saves his skin by throwing others to the wolves.  Sometimes, 
we feel sorry for him but we blame him nonetheless the way we do not blame a 
reasonably mistaken person or a two-year-old child.  This is inconsistent with the 
theory of excuses—at least complete excuses.  A complete excuse eliminates the 
defendant’s responsibility for the wrongful act and, accordingly, eradicates his 
blameworthiness.42 
Unlike excuses, justifications leave room for blaming the actor.  Take a 
paradigmatic case of necessity: to save a town from flooding, the actor detracts the 
water and floods a farm.43  If prosecuted for criminal mischief, he would certainly 
have a strong defense of necessity, but shouldn’t the farmer whose home, pets, and 
livestock were destroyed by that actor have the right to blame him?  I think he 
should.  Similarly, if the actor flooded the farm not because of the natural necessity 
but because he was threatened with violence in case of his disobedience, the farmer 
should have the right to blame him.  In contrast, the farmer should not have the 
right to blame a legally insane actor who flooded his farm because of a 
schizophrenic delusion. 
The blameworthiness of the coerced actor sets him apart from all excused 
actors and, conversely, reveals his family resemblance with justified actors, which 
suggests that duress is only a partial excuse and that it has a strong justificatory 
component.  Let’s test this proposition by, first, comparing the legal requirements 
                                                                                                                                      
41  Dressler holds similar reservations about duress even though he still classifies duress as an 
excuse.  See Exegesis of the Law of Duress, supra note 1, at 1359–60.  See Reflections on Excusing 
Wrongdoers, supra note 2, at 710 (“In cases of duress . . . the actor knows what he is doing, knows 
that his conduct is wrong, and has the physiological and psychological capacity to obey the law, yet 
he nonetheless asks to be excused for his wrongdoing.”). 
42  See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT 
AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 158, 174 (1968): 
[M]ost lawyers, laymen and moralists, considering the legal doctrine of mens rea and the 
excuses that the law admits, would conclude that what the law has done here is to reflect, 
albeit imperfectly, a fundamental principle of morality that a person is not to be blamed 
for what he has done if he could not help doing it. 
43  MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1985). 
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of duress and other excuses, and then exploring what additional considerations 
may strengthen or weaken the defense of duress. 
 
B. Duress v. Other Excuses: Legal Requirements and Limitations 
 
Duress possesses important requirements and limitations that distinguish it 
from a typical excuse defense.  Among those are the following: 
 
1. Duress is limited to external inducements affecting the defendant’s 
motivations, whereas all other excuses (e.g., minority, insanity, 
involuntary intoxication, and mistake) are internal impairments 
affecting the defendant’s capacities.  If the defense of duress were 
like other excuses, internal fears, pressures, and phobias should be 
eligible for the defense too.  For example, a defendant, who killed the 
victim out of sincere and overpowering fear that the victim would 
reveal a shameful secret and thus destroy the defendant’s career, 
should be acquitted.  But he is not, and this is morally appropriate.44 
 
2. Duress requires “clean hands,” namely, the lack of the subjective 
fault on the part of the actor in finding himself in the coercive 
situation.  A reckless actor loses the defense entirely not only under 
the common law but under the much more liberal MPC too.45  Other 
excuses have no similar limitations (at least with respect to intentional 
offenses).46  Suppose, a person became legally insane because he had 
spent his youth recklessly enjoying illegal drugs—he still would be 
allowed to plead insanity in any prosecution.  In contrast, an actor 
who had recklessly made himself vulnerable to coercion would have 
no defense in prosecution for the crime he was forced to commit.  For 
example, a defendant who had voluntarily joined a criminal gang 
engaged in petty thefts would not be able to claim duress if he were 
                                                                                                                                      
44  United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (opining that the defense of 
duress is “inapplicable to a purely internal psychic incapacity”). 
45  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(2) (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1985). 
46  Even a mistaken actor whose mistake is a result of his own recklessness usually may raise 
the defense in prosecution for an intentional crime.  See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1)(a) (AM. 
LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (“Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact 
or law is a defense if . . . the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge [or] belief . . . 
required to establish a material element of the offense”).  Some courts, however, ignore this logic and 
allow the defense of mistake only when the mistake is reasonable.  This approach has been properly 
criticized by the MPC commentators: “There is no justification . . . for requiring that ignorance or 
mistake be reasonable if the crime or the element of the crime involved requires acting purposely or 
knowingly.”  Id. 
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later coerced by a credible threat of injury to take part in an armed 
robbery.47 
 
3. All other excuses are subjective: they are based on individual 
disabilities of the actor.  Surely, it would be silly to allow the defense 
of insanity only to a “reasonably insane” actor.  Even the more 
moralistic defense of mistake is usually available in prosecution for 
intentional crimes to the actor who was honestly (if unreasonably) 
mistaken.48  Duress is different; it is largely based on an objective 
standard.  Naturally, to be able to claim duress, the defendant has to 
feel threatened.  But even this subjective element is severely curtailed 
by the limitation placed on the kind of threat that may be claimed as 
the cause of this feeling: the threat has to be of physical harm to a 
person.  A threat of slaying dear sweet Lassie who is practically a 
family member does not qualify for the defense.  Were duress like 
other excuses, any threat, which indeed broke the will of the actor, 
would be allowed as a predicate to the defense.  The objective 
character of duress is underscored by further restrictions.  This 
defense would be denied to an actor who honestly but unreasonably 
believed that he would be seriously hurt.49  It would also be denied to 
an actor whose will was truly overborne, provided that “a person of 
reasonable moral strength,”50 or “a person of nonsaintly moral 
strength,”51 could resist the threat.52 
Take the defendants of the famous R v. Dudley and Stephens.53  
Dressler has argued that their convictions were unjust.  Thomas 
Dudley and Edwin Stephens should have been allowed to plead to the 
jury that they had killed Richard Parker under coercive 
circumstances, and thus deserved to be excused.54  Perhaps so, but if 
                                                                                                                                      
47  R v. Sharp [1987] 3 WLR 1 at 8–9 (Lord  Lane) (UK) (holding that, where defendant 
“voluntarily, and with knowledge of its nature, joined a criminal organisation or gang which he knew 
might bring pressure on him to commit an offence and was an active member when he was put under 
such pressure, he cannot avail himself of the defence of duress.”). 
48  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985). 
49  R v. Hurst [1995] 1 Cr. App. R. 82 (Lord Beldam) (UK). 
50  Exegesis of the Law of Duress, supra note 1, at 1367. 
51  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
52  GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 1129 (Dennis J. Baker ed., 4th ed. 
2015) (“The objective limitation upon the defence means that the threat must be such that a similarly 
situated defendant could not reasonably be expected to resist.”). 
53  R v. Dudley & Stephens [1884] 14 QBD 273 (Lord Coleridge) (UK). 
54  Reflections on Dudley and Stephens, supra note 2. 
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duress by circumstances included the same objective requirements of 
moral strength as the traditional duress, these defendants would have 
been unlikely to succeed.  After all, Edmund Brooks (who was not 
very saintly) was on that lifeboat too, and he refused to participate in 
the killing.55 
 
4. In most jurisdictions, duress is not available as a defense to murder 
(and sometimes, other grave offenses).56  No other excuse is limited 
in this way.  A person who committed homicide due to insanity, 
involuntary intoxication, or a reasonable mistake would be 
completely exonerated.  In contrast, intentional killing under duress 
would either not be excused at all or (as in a handful of the U.S. 
jurisdictions) be mitigated to homicide of a lesser degree.57 
 
C. Moral Factors Relevant to the Defense of Duress 
 
The difference between the requirements and limitations of duress and other 
excuses raises doubt whether these defenses in fact belong together.  This doubt 
grows as we consider another fundamental difference: all other excuses are 
categorical.  As long as the defendant crosses the line of the relevant incapacity 
and fits into a certain category, he is exonerated.  We do not question what the 
defendant actually did and how much harm he caused in his excused condition.  
Duress is different—the determination of the actor’s volitional impairment is only 
the first step in the duress analysis.  Further steps involve balancing numerous 
                                                                                                                                                   
Call this a necessity excuse, or call this duress by circumstances, but by whatever label, 
the men in that lifeboat were entitled to the opportunity to try to persuade a jury of their 
peers that as a matter of justice—not “mere” compassion or exercise of executive 
mercy—they should be exculpated. 
Id. at 145 (footnotes omitted).  See also Exegesis of the Law of Duress, supra note 1, at 1374 
(critically observing that “[n]either the common law nor the MPC excuses such actions”) (footnote 
omitted). 
55  See A. W. B. Simpson, Cannibals at Common Law, 27 LAW SCH. REC. 3, 4–7 (1981) 
(discussing the facts of R v. Dudley & Stephens in light of the “custom of the sea”). 
56  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5206(a) (2018) (excluding murder and voluntary 
manslaughter); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.090 (2017) (excluding intentional homicide); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 18-1-708 (2017) (excluding all class 1 felonies); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.060 (2017) 
(excluding murder, manslaughter, and homicide by abuse). 
57  See 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 115 (noting that as a general matter “neither duress, 
coercion, nor compulsion are defenses to murder”).  See also State v. McCartney, 684 So. 2d 416, 
425 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the defense of compulsion is unavailable in murder 
prosecutions); State v. Weston, 219 P. 180, 185 (Or. 1923) (stating that “[f]ear, duress or compulsion 
due to the act of another, seems to be considered no excuse for taking the life of a third person.”).  
For examples of statutes mitigating the gravity of homicide committed under duress see, e.g., N.J. 
REV. STAT. § 2C:2-9 (2013) (“In a prosecution for murder, the defense is only available to reduce the 
degree of the crime to manslaughter.”); WIS. STAT. § 939.46 (2017) (reducing first-degree intentional 
homicide to second-degree intentional homicide). 
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factors, which play at least a moral, if not always a legal, role in determining the 
relative strength or weakness of the defendant’s claim for the defense.  Let’s 
consider some of those factors. 
 
1. The Heinousness of the Defendant’s Conduct 
 
The absolute58 heinousness of the specific acts performed by the defendant 
(not merely the crime of conviction) should affect the strength of his defense.  It 
has been argued, that, contrary to the traditional common law rule, sometimes 
duress should be allowed in prosecution for murder.59  The circumstances of the 
crime can make one murder less heinous than another.60  “Heinousness is a word of 
degree, and that there are lesser degrees of heinousness, even of involvement in 
homicide, seems beyond doubt.”61  Conversely, a high degree of heinousness 
should make the defendant’s plea for the defense of duress quite weak.  Take the 
case of John Bannister and Michael Howe who, under a threat of violence, 
participated in several atrocious crimes.  One of their victims was a young boy, 
Elgar. 
 
From thenceforwards Elgar, who was naked, sobbing and begging for 
mercy, was tortured, compelled to undergo appalling sexual perversions 
and indignities, he was kicked and punched.  Bannister and Howe were 
doing the kicking and punching . . . .  It is unnecessary to go into further 
details of the attack on Elgar which are positively nauseating.  In brief 
the two appellants asserted that they had only acted as they did through 
fear of Murray, believing that they would be treated in the same way as 
Elgar had been treated if they did not comply with Murray’s directions.62 
 
Bannister and Howe did not have a strong claim for the defense to start with (in 
part, because they recklessly made themselves vulnerable to coercion) but, even if 
they did not have that obstacle, the sheer heinousness of their actions should make 
their claim for exculpation extremely weak.63 
 
                                                                                                                                      
58  I am focusing here on the heinousness of the defendants’ actions independently of the 
relative heinousness of the threat. 
59  Exegesis of the Law of Duress, supra note 1, at 1370–74. 
60  D.P.P. for Nothern Ireland v. Lynch [1975] AC 653 (HL) 680–81 (Lord Wilberforce). 
61  Id. at 681. 
62  R v. Howe [1987] AC 417 (HL) 424 (Lord Hailsham) (UK). 
63  Dressler should agree with that conclusion.  See Exegesis of the Law of Duress, supra note 
1, at 1373–74 (trusting jury to demand more moral strength when defendants are forced to take even 
a minor part in “an especially barbaric scenario, such as the Holocaust”). 
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2. The Gap Between the Threat and the Harm 
 
As noted above, the defense of duress acquires its independent significance 
only when the harm the defendant inflicted is equal to or higher than the harm with 
which he was threatened.  The smaller the gap between the two harms, the stronger 
the defendant’s claim for the defense should be, and vice versa.64  So, a man acting 
under the threat of impending death would have a stronger defense if, in order to 
avoid the death, he shot one innocent person, and a weaker defense if he shot a 
hundred.  Similarly, a man threatened with a severe beating will have a stronger 
defense if, in order to avoid it, he gave an innocent victim a commensurable 
beating and a weaker claim if he beat the innocent victim to death.  Dressler in his 
own way holds the same: “Society . . . has a right to expect a person to demonstrate 
a higher level of moral strength when ordered to kill a hundred innocent children 
than when commanded to kill one.”65 
 
3. Would the Harm Happen Anyway? 
 
If the victims would suffer the same kind and amount of harm, regardless of 
whether or not the actor complied with his coercers’ requests, the actor should 
have a stronger defense.  Take the case of Drazen Erdemović prosecuted by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for his participation in a 
mass execution of unarmed Muslim men and boys in 1995.  Erdemović raised the 
defense of duress, telling the Tribunal that, when his unit was ordered to shoot the 
civilians, he first refused and conceded only after he was threatened with instant 
death: “If you don’t wish to do it, stand in the line with the rest of them and give 
others your rifle so that they can shoot you.”66 
Considering that Erdemović’s refusal to shoot would not have changed 
anything in the plight of the civilians, his claim for the defense should be stronger 
than if his choice would have determined whether the civilians lived or died.67  
                                                                                                                                      
64  D.P.P. for Nothern Ireland v. Lynch [1975] AC 653 (HL) 681 (Lord Wilberforce) (UK) 
(“Nobody would dispute that the greater the degree of heinousness of the crime, the greater and less 
resistible must be the degree of pressure, if pressure is to excuse.”). 
65  Exegesis of the Law of Duress, supra note 1, at 1373–74. 
66  Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment ¶ 8 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997). 
67  Luis Chiesa makes a similar observation but, unlike me, considers this factor sufficient for 
full acquittal.  See Luis E. Chiesa, Duress, Demanding Heroism, and Proportionality, 41 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 741, 771 (2008) (“Because the actor effectively lacked the capacity to prevent the 
harm threatened from occurring, punishing the actor for deciding to save her own life instead of 
dying to protect innocent people who were going to die anyway would be unfair”).  I am not 
persuaded by this argument; in response, I would like to quote Lord Hailsham’s opinion in R v. 
Howe, in which he said that, if we believe that duress exculpates murder, “some hundreds who 
suffered the death penalty at Nuremberg for murders were surely the victims of judicial murder at the 
hands of their conquerors owing to the operation of article 8”).  See R v. Howe [1987] AC 417 (HL) 
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Erdemović’s situation can be compared to a classic example of necessity in which, 
according to a vastly respected authority, the defendant should be exculpated: 
“Several men are roped together on the Alps.  They slip, and the weight of the 
whole party is thrown on one, who cuts the rope in order to save himself.  Here the 
question is not whether some shall die, but whether one shall live.”68 
 
4. What was Defendant’s Role in the Offense? 
 
The defendant should have a much stronger claim for the defense if his 
coerced participation in the crime was minor and non-essential.  For example, if he 
was “an innocent passer-by seized in the street by a gang of criminals visibly 
engaged in robbery and murder in a shop and compelled at the point of a gun to 
issue misleading comments to the public, or an innocent driver compelled at the 
point of a gun to convey the murderer to the victim.”69  An accomplice in a crime 
usually carries a lesser moral responsibility than the principal; however, this is not 
always the case.  Lord Griffith wrote in R v. Howe: 
 
[A]s a matter of commonsense one participant in a murder may be 
considered less morally at fault than another.  The youth who hero-
worships the gangleader and acts as lookout man whilst the gang enter a 
jeweller’s shop and kill the owner in order to steal is an obvious example 
. . . .  However, it is not difficult to give examples where more moral 
fault may be thought to attach to a participant in murder who was not the 
actual killer;  [One] example [is] contract killing, when the murder would 
never have taken place if a contract had not been placed to take the life 
of the victim.  Another example would be an intelligent man goading a 
weakminded individual into a killing he would not otherwise commit.70 
 
Dressler shares this intuition.  While advocating for the availability of duress as a 
defense to homicide, he puts his trust in the jury, supposing that “juries would 
probably excuse many coerced accomplices to murders, especially those whose 
participation in the crime was relatively minor, while usually punishing 
triggermen.”71 
                                                                                                                                                   
434 (Lord Hailsham) (UK); see also Charter of the International Military Tribunal art.8 (1945) (“The 
fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him 
from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines 
that justice so requires.”). 
68  JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 25 n.1 (5th ed., London, 
MacMillian & Co. 1894). 
69  R v Brown [1968] SASR 467, 494 (Austl.) (Bray, C.J., dissenting). 
70  R v. Howe [1987] AC 417 (HL) 444–45 (Lord Griffith) (UK). 
71  Exegesis of the Law of Duress, supra note 1, at 1373 (footnote omitted). 
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English courts addressed this issue in several important decisions—Lynch v. 
Director of Public Prosecutions; Abbot v. The Queen; and R v. Howe among 
others.72  At the time of the Lynch decision, an aider and abettor to murder was not 
entitled to the defense of duress in the same way as the principal was not.  Yet 
when the assistance was minor and non-essential, the harsh treatment seemed 
unfair, and the court allowed Joseph Lynch, who merely drove assassins to the 
place of the murder, to claim the defense.73 
A year later, the Abbot court had to reconsider this issue in a case in which the 
defendant’s participation was much more essential: he was holding the resisting 
victim down while the killer was stabbing her with a cutlass.74  The court 
distinguished the facts of Abbot from those of Lynch and refused the defendant’s 
plea for duress over the dissenting judges’ warnings that it was impossible to draw 
a principled line between the two cases.75  Finally, in R v. Howe, the court 
overruled Lynch and went back to the original rule that the defense of duress is 
never available in prosecution for murder.76  The Howe defendants, who pleaded 
duress as a defense to two counts of murder and one count of conspiracy to commit 
murder, were directly involved in torturing and killing their victims.77 
I believe that the Howe court erred in failing to see the dramatic difference 
between the facts of Lynch, on the one hand, and Abbot and Howe on the other.  In 
Lynch, the defendant, by driving the principals to the victim, only made possible 
their independent intervening act of killing.78  His driving was an act separate from 
and nonessential to the act of killing.  In contrast, in Abbot and Howe, the 
defendants’ conduct was an integral part of the killings; they did the harm while 
Lynch merely enabled it.  This difference is morally significant79 and it should put 
Lynch in a different category than Abbot, Howe, and Bannister.  Moreover, the 
harmfulness of Lynch’s personal conduct (bringing the dangerous and violent 
people to the victim) was, arguably, lower than the harm he sought to avoid (being 
shot on the spot).  Properly understood, the choice of evils defense should look to 
the defendant’s conduct, not the crime of conviction.  If Lynch could claim that 
                                                                                                                                      
72  D.P.P. for Northern Ireland v. Lynch [1975] AC 653 (HL); Abbott v. The Queen [1976] 3 
WLR 462 (PC) (Lord Salmon); R v. Howe [1987] AC 417 (HL) (Lord Hailsham ) (UK). 
73  D.P.P. for Northern Ireland v. Lynch [1975] AC 653 (HL). 
74  Abbott v. The Queen [1976] 3 WLR at 465 (PC) (Lord Salmon). 
75  Id. at 471–76 (Lord Wilberforce and Lord Edmund-Davies, dissenting). 
76  R v. Howe [1987] AC 417 (HL) (Lord Hailsham) (UK). 
77  The first victim, Elgar, was strangled to death by another person but the court found that 
the kicks and punches inflicted by the defendants “would have resulted in death moments later even 
in the absence of the strangulation.”  Id. at 424.  The defendants kicked, punched, and then strangled 
to death their second victim.  Their third intended victim managed to escape.  Id. 
78  MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 697 n.68 (1997). 
79  See, e.g., Philippa Foot, Morality, Action, and Outcome, in MORAL DILEMMAS: AND OTHER 
TOPICS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (2002). 
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defense, he would not even need to rely on duress—his actions would have been 
deemed justified. 
 
5. Doing v. Allowing 
 
There is a morally important distinction “between what one does or causes 
and what one merely allows.”80  The former involves the violation of a negative 
duty not to do morally impermissible things, whereas the latter involves the 
violation of a positive duty not to allow morally impermissible things where one 
can prevent them.81  It is usually recognized that negative rights and duties are 
much more stringent than positive ones.82  A woman who, under the threat of 
violence, does not stop the beating of her little child by her abusive boyfriend 
should have a stronger claim for the defense than a woman who, under the same 
threat, does the beating herself. 
 
6. Saving Self v. Saving Another 
 
There appears to be a moral difference between protecting oneself and 
protecting another.  We praise people who save lives of others; we do not “praise” 
people for saving their own lives.  By the rule of the converse, if threatened with 
the harm to an innocent bystander, the defendant commits a grave crime he should 
have a stronger claim for the defense than if the threat was directed at him 
personally.83 
 
7. Conflicting Duties 
 
The defendant should have a stronger claim for the defense if his duty not to 
follow the coercer’s order conflicted with his other preexisting duty—for example, 
the duty to protect the person whom the coercer threatens to harm.  Such a duty of 
protection may be owed to a close family member; a person whom the defendant 
                                                                                                                                      
80  See id. at 89–90; PHILIPPA FOOT, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double 
Effect, in VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 26 (1978); Fiona Woollard 
& Frances Howard-Snyder, Doing vs. Allowing Harm, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Nov. 1, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/doing-allowing/ [https://perma.cc/
XB8W-XNF6].  For a critique of the moral distinction between doing and allowing, see e.g., James 
Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 78 (1975); JONATHAN BENNETT, THE 
ACT ITSELF (1995). 
81  See MOORE, supra note 78, at 689 (discussing Philippa Foot’s viewpoint). 
82  Id.; Philippa Foot, Killing and Letting Die, in MORAL DILEMMAS: AND OTHER TOPICS IN 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 79; Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The 
Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, 98 PHIL. REV. 287 (1989); FIONA WOOLLARD, DOING AND 
ALLOWING HARM (2015). 
83  For recognition of this difference see, e.g., R v. Gotts [1992] 2 AC 412 (HL) 436 (Lord 
Lowry, dissenting) (suggesting that “a threat not to the killer, but to others, in particular his wife and 
children . . . fundamentally alters the moral problem”). 
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has put in peril; or a person whom the defendant is contractually obligated to 
protect.84  So, if a group of first-graders is kidnapped together with their teacher, 
and the teacher, threatened with the imminent execution of the children, helps to 
plant a bomb under a post office thus causing an explosion and numerous 
casualties, the teacher should have a stronger claim for the defense than if he did 
the same in order to protect a group of strangers to whom he owed no duty of care. 
 
8. Intending v. Foreseeing v. Risking 
 
The coerced defendant should have a stronger claim for the defense if he did 
not intend the harm to happen but merely foresaw it.85  He should have an even 
stronger claim if he committed the criminal act that only contained a risk of the 
harm.  Thus, a person who, under the threat of death, plants a bomb under a post 
office, does not intend the bomb to explode; he merely foresees that it will.  
Similarly, a person forced to participate in an armed robbery may recognize the 
risk—but not foresee it—that the robbery would turn deadly.  Utilizing those 
distinctions, Lord Morris, in Lynch, argued that the defense of duress should be 
allowed in prosecution for homicide to the defendant who facilitated the killing but 
was not the killer. 
 
Let two situations be supposed.  In each let it be supposed that there is a 
real and effective threat of death.  In one a person is required under such 
duress to drive a car to a place or to carry a gun to a place with 
knowledge that at such place it is planned that X is to be killed by those 
who are imposing their will.  In the other situation let it be supposed that 
a person under such duress is told that he himself must there and then kill 
X.  In either situation there is a terrible agonising choice of evils.  In the 
former to save his life the person drives the car or carries the gun.  He 
may cling to the hope that perhaps X will not be found at the place or 
that there will be a change of intention before the purpose is carried out 
or that in some unforeseen way the dire event of a killing will be averted.  
The final and fatal moment of decision has not arrived.  He saves his 
own life at a time when the loss of another life is not a certainty.  In the 
second (if indeed it is a situation likely to arise) the person is told that to 
save his life he himself must personally there and then take an innocent 
life.  It is for him to pull the trigger or otherwise personally to do the act 
of killing.  There, I think, before allowing duress as a defence it may be 
that the law will have to call a halt.86 
                                                                                                                                      
84  See KADISH, SCHULHOFER & BARKOW, supra note 36, at 245–51. 
85  See, e.g., Alison McIntyre, Doctrine of Double Effect, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY. (Sept. 23, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/ [https://perma.cc/
PWT2-SAE4]. 
86  D.P.P. for Northern Ireland v. Lynch [1975] AC 653 (HL) 671 (Lord Morris).  
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*    *    * 
The examination of the factors listed above reveals that the coerced actor 
should have a stronger claim for the defense of duress if, on the scale of “low to 
high,” he scored relatively low for: 
 
(i)   the amount of harm he inflicted—(1); 
(ii)   his personal involvement in furthering the crime—(4), (5); 
(iii) his culpability (“guilty mind”)—(1), (8); 
(iv) the causal impact of his actions—(3), (4); or 
(v)  the disparity between two evils—the one he was able to avoid 
(admittedly, the lesser or equal) and the other (the graver or equal) 
which he inflicted in order to avoid the former—(2), (6), (7). 
 
I think that Dressler could agree with these conclusions, at least up to this 
point.  These conclusions, however, present a problem to Dressler’s theory of 
duress.  All the variables above relate to the act’s wrongfulness, not the actor’s 
responsibility, and thus strongly confirm the justificatory component of the 
defense.  Surely, the “relatively low” level of wrongfulness does not yet make the 
act right.  The coerced harmful act remains wrongful—it is not justified—but it is 
less wrongful than it would be if these variables measured high.  That is why the 
coerced act is only partially justified.87 
It is important to underscore here that, despite all its justificatory 
characteristics, duress does not completely justify the coerced actor.  Erdemović, 
whose refusal to execute the civilians would not have saved their lives, 
nevertheless is a killer; and in no circumstances shall we send a message to the 
community that it is permissible to participate in mass executions.88  Similarly, a 
mother who does not stop the beating of her child by her abusive boyfriend is not 
justified.  We may feel sorry for her but by no means shall we send out a message 
that not defending one’s child is “a good thing, or the right or sensible thing, or a 
permissible thing to do.”89  To the extent duress is a justification, its justificatory 
component does not carry enough moral weight to merit complete exculpation. 
We could try to put together another set of variables, such that would affect 
the actor’s responsibility rather than the wrongfulness of the act.  That set would 
be rather short though—what matters for the issue of responsibility is the severity 
of the actor’s impairment; the severity of the threat is per se unimportant.  Thus, 
                                                                                                                                      
87  Douglas N. Husak, Partial Defenses, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 167, 169 (1998) (pointing out 
the desert-based nature of partial justification and excuses). 
88  I thus reject Peter Westen and James Mangiafico’s theory of duress that provides the 
coerced actor with complete justification on the notion that, due to the unlawful, purposely coercive 
relationship created by duress, the same or greater harm imposed by the actor may still be a lesser evil 
for the purposes of justification calculus.  See Westen & Mangiafico, supra note 30, at 836. 
89  John L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY: READINGS IN 
PHILOSOPHY AND LAW 6 (Herbert Morris ed., 1961). 
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the defense should be denied to an actor who, even though threatened with a severe 
harm, committed a crime not because of the debilitating fear but for other reasons 
(a personal grudge against the victim, for example). 
On the other hand, as soon as it is determined that the actor committed the 
crime (solely) because he feared the threatened retaliation and his fear significantly 
limited his ability to comply with the requirements of the law—the reasonableness 
of that fear; the standard of conduct of a law abiding citizen (or any other objective 
standard); the particular circumstances of the actor; the disparity between the harm 
threatened and the harm inflicted—should be irrelevant for the plea of excuse.  
Yet, all these factors are at the core of Dressler’s normative theory of duress.  To 
retain them, Dressler would have to admit that duress is not reducible to an excuse. 
To be clear, duress certainly has an excusatory component, namely the 
volitional impairment of the actor, but this component carries only a portion of the 
normative weight of the defense.  If we focused on the actor’s reduced 
responsibility alone, we would have to allow the defense whenever the actor acted 
under the influence of fear, including the unreasonable fear and the fear of minor 
injuries or non-physical harm.  And we would have to allow duress as a defense to 
any crime—including gang rape, deadly torture, and mass execution of innocent 
people—whenever the actor chooses to commit these crimes to avoid harm to 
himself.  It is unlikely that such a defense may be acceptable morally or 
analytically in any society recognizant of individual rights. 
So, where does this discussion bring us?  I believe it brings us to the 
recognition that it is inaccurate to characterize duress as an excuse (or justification) 
alone.  To the extent duress may do any normative work, it has to function as a 
partial justification in addition to a partial excuse.  Duress is not unique in this 
way.  A few other defenses combine elements of justification and excuse.  For 
example, excessive use of force in self-defense is wrongful—to the extent it is 
excessive—and, even though, generically, self-defense is a justification, 
disproportionate self-defense is at best an “imperfect” justification, which does not 
exonerate the defendant.90 
Another example of the combination of a justification and an excuse is the 
defense of provocation, or the heat of passion, which reduces murder to 
manslaughter.  Unlike the imperfect self-defense, it does not have a “perfect” pair; 
however, it too is based on the defendant’s overreaction to an assault on his 
interests.  Predictably, Dressler and I disagree about the nature of provocation—for 
                                                                                                                                      
90  The doctrine of imperfect self-defense is available in some jurisdictions to provide a partial 
defense to the defendant who acted unreasonably in defending himself; the charge of murder is 
reduced to manslaughter.  See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2503(b) (2015) (reducing murder to 
voluntary manslaughter); State v. Faulkner, 483 A.2d 759, 761 (Md. 1984) (holding that the honest 
but unreasonable belief, although not a complete defense, “mitigates murder to voluntary 
manslaughter”); Reid Griffith Fontaine, An Attack on Self-Defense, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 57, 82 
(2010) (“Because the defender is partially justified in his commission of reactive violence, and 
because he is mistaken as to the degree of force warranted by the threat, he should not be convicted 
of the charge of murder, but rather the lesser charge of voluntary manslaughter.”). 
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him, provocation is an excuse only.91  I have discussed the difference in our views 
elsewhere,92 so I will not expand on it here.  Instead, I would like to underscore 
just one argument relevant to the current discussion for why provocation not only 
renders the actor less responsible but also makes the killing less wrongful.93  It is 
less wrongful because it is responsive, and responsive acts do not carry the same 
moral weight as independent acts.94  The killing would not have happened but for 
the provocation; it is the provoker who, in a large part, is responsible for the 
killer’s “guilty mind”; and thus the killer should not answer for all the harm caused 
by his actions—a portion of that harm is attributable to the provoker.  It has been 
powerfully argued that harm has an independent moral significance and the 
amount of harm caused by one’s actions has a direct impact on the wrongfulness of 
those actions.95  Accordingly, a provoked killing is not as wrongful as the 
                                                                                                                                      
91  Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult 
Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 974 (2002) [hereinafter Provocation Defense] (“The modern defense 
is . . . about excusable loss of self-control. . . . Under no circumstances is the provoked killing 
justifiable in the slightest; indeed, the actor’s violent loss of self-control is unjustifiable.”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
92  See generally Vera Bergelson, Justification or Excuse? Exploring the Meaning of 
Provocation, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 307 (2009); Vera Bergelson, Victims and Perpetrators: An 
Argument for Comparative Liability in Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 385 (2005) [hereinafter 
Victims and Perpetrators]. 
93  Andrew Ashworth makes a similar argument: “Surely it is the combination of the elements 
of partial excuse and partial justification . . . which raises sufficient exculpation to warrant a 
reduction to manslaughter.”  ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 245–46 (1991). 
94  Dressler insightfully compares duress to proximate causation: “we determine when the 
exceptional nature of a threat causes us to believe that the actor’s conduct, although ‘an antecedent 
but for which the result in question would not have occurred,’ is morally ‘too remote . . . to have a 
[just] bearing on the actor’s liability . . . .’”  Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers, supra note 2, at 
710 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985)).  This comparison, however, only underscores my point that the responsiveness of 
the act makes the act less wrongful.  See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 192 (6th 
ed. 2012) (explaining how, generally, a responsive intervening act does not relieve the initial 
wrongdoer of criminal responsibility).  “This outcome is justifiable.  The defendant’s initial 
wrongdoing caused the response.  Since he is responsible for the presence of the intervening force, 
the defendant should not escape liability unless the intervening force was so out-of-the-ordinary that 
it is no longer fair to hold him criminally responsible for the outcome.”  Id.  The same logic applies to 
a provoker who should be deemed responsible, at least in part, for the responsive act of the defendant. 
95  Michael Moore, Victims and Retribution: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 65, 87 (1999) (arguing that “the amount of harm caused determines the seriousness of the wrong 
done”).  See also MOORE, supra note 78 at 193 (arguing that, in addition to culpability, “wrongdoing 
independently influences how much punishment is deserved”).  Other scholars disagree that harm has 
independent moral significance.  See, e.g., Kimberly D. Kessler, The Role of Luck in the Criminal 
Law, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 2183 (1994) (critiquing Moore’s position). 
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unprovoked, and the reduced wrongfulness of that killing makes provocation 
(among other things) a partial justification.96 
A similar argument applies to duress.  A coerced actor is not as guilty as an 
actor with the unrestricted free choice.  Quoting Lord Kilbrandon’s argument in 
D.P.P. for Northern Ireland v. Lynch: 
 
[T]he decision of the threatened man whose constancy is overborne so 
that he yields to the threat, is a calculated decision to do what he knows 
to be wrong, and is therefore that of a man with, perhaps to some 
exceptionally limited extent, a “guilty mind.”  But he is at the same time 
a man whose mind is less guilty than is his who acts as he does but under 
no such constraint.97 
 
Of course, the fact that the actor’s “guilty mind” is not as guilty as it would 
have been in the absence of duress does not eliminate the wrongfulness of the 
actor’s criminal actions but it makes them less wrongful.  Likewise, a coercive 
threat does not eliminate the actor’s power of moral choice but it limits that power.  
How much weight shall be given to the reduction in the wrongfulness of the act 
and the responsibility of the actor depends, to a large degree, on the meaning we 
assign to duress. 
 
II. DURESS AS A DEFENSE OF NO-FAIR-OPPORTUNITY 
 
Dressler’s theory of excuses accedes to H.L.A. Hart’s theory of punishment.  
Hart insisted that the moral license to punish is needed by society and “unless a 
man has the capacity and a  fair opportunity or chance to adjust his behaviour to 
the law its penalties ought not to be applied to him.”98  Dressler’s theory is focused 
on the actor’s personhood, but he too argues that an actor may not be reached by 
blame or punishment unless “he had the capacity and fair opportunity to function 
in a uniquely human way, i.e., freely to choose whether to violate the moral/legal 
norms of society.”99  Duress is a defense of no-fair-opportunity.100  Fair 
                                                                                                                                      
96  Husak, supra note 87, at 169. 
97  D.P.P. for Northern Ireland v. Lynch [1975] AC 653, (HL) 703 (Lord Kilbrandon). 
98  HART, supra note 42, at 181 (emphasis added). 
99  Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers, supra note 2, at 701 (footnote omitted).  “‘Free 
choice’ exists if the actor has the substantial capacity and fair opportunity to: (1) understand the 
pertinent facts relating to his conduct; (2) appreciate that his conduct violates society’s moral or legal 
norms; and (3) conform his conduct to the law.”  Id. 
100 Exegesis of the Law of Duress, supra note 1, at 1365 (“A person acting under duress is 
excused, although he possessed the capacity to make the right choice, if he lacked a fair opportunity 
to act lawfully or, slightly more accurately, if he lacked a fair opportunity to avoid acting 
unlawfully.”). 
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opportunity “is lacking if a person of reasonable moral strength cannot fairly be 
expected to resist the threat.”101 
At first glance, the “lack of fair opportunity” theory seems very attractive 
from the desert perspective.  Indeed, if an actor lacks a “fair opportunity” to 
conform his conduct to the law, how can we blame him?  There are, however, at 
least two problems with this theory: one, conceptual; the other, line-drawing. 
The conceptual problem of the “fair opportunity” theory is its vagueness and 
circularity.  What is a “fair opportunity”?  On the one hand, as Dressler 
acknowledges, any person who is coerced into choosing between suffering harm 
and committing a crime lacks the fair opportunity he would have had in the 
absence of coercion.102  And yet we do not excuse people who commit crimes in 
order to protect their property, career, or reputation even though their freedom of 
choice may be significantly impaired.  Neither do we excuse those who yield to 
lawful threats,103 even though lawful threats can be very coercive.  And Dressler 
does not argue that we should excuse them.  Then what is the lack of a “fair 
opportunity”?  For Dressler, this is a prescriptive rather than descriptive concept—
it encompasses a set of circumstances in which it would be unfair to blame the 
coerced actor who broke the law.104 
Unfortunately, this concept does not provide much guidance.  In fact, it is 
rather circular.  All it tells us is that it is unfair to blame an actor who has yielded 
to a threat in the circumstances, in which it would be unfair to blame the actor for 
yielding to such a threat.  I am doubtful that this standard may serve as a basis for a 
coherent and morally sound legal rule.  Unlike the much narrower MPC rule, 
which defines duress in terms of the actor’s incapacity,105 Dressler’s rule 
exculpates those who were capable of resisting the threat but chose not to.106  Why 
                                                                                                                                      
101 Id. at 1385. 
102 Id. at 1366. 
103 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.440 (2017) (listing “unlawful force” as a requirement of 
duress); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-412 (2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-208 (2017); COLO. REV. STAT. § 
18-1-708 (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-231 (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.090 (2017); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 40.00 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-302 (2017).  See also Westen & Mangiafico, 
supra note 30, at 905 (making a similar observation). 
104 Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers, supra note 2, at 702 (maintaining that “the excusing 
process involves a normative judgment about the degree to which people may fairly be expected to 
apply their capacities in the defendant’s immediate circumstances.”). 
105 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(2) cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985) (comparing the coerced actor’s “psychological incapacity” to physical incapacity, 
which negates voluntary act under section 2.01).  See also The American Law Institute, 37th Annual 
Meeting, 1960 A.L.I. PROC. 106, 120 (1961) (Herbert Wechsler, the Chief Reporter of the MPC, in 
discussion of the defense, stating, “I emphasize those words ‘unable to resist,’ because we really 
mean, as the comments indicate, unable to resist—not, would have decided not to resist, but would 
have been unable to resist.”). 
106 Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers, supra note 2, at 711 (maintaining that in extreme 
circumstances “[w]e will choose (it is a choice) to take the wrong route”). 
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those actors deserve exculpation requires a morally compelling normative 
explanation. 
Dressler recognizes this difficulty107 but does not offer an explanation other 
than that “we as humans are sufficiently fallible that in extreme circumstances we 
will nearly inevitably (the near inevitability seems critical) succumb to our 
weaknesses.”108  This explanation is intended to provide context to Dressler’s 
general principle of punishment that “society does not and should not expect the 
impossible; indeed, it should not always expect even the possible.”109  In the 
abstract, this is a good principle, except that the less moral agency society expects 
of its members, the more likely it is that “difficult” moral choices will be seen as 
“impossible.” 
As a descriptive matter, I do not dispute Dressler’s assessment of our 
fallibility; in fact, I would go a step further to suggest that we as humans are so 
fallible that, with due incentives, we will succumb to our weaknesses even in the 
absence of extreme circumstances—that is, unless we have good reasons not to 
succumb.  The fear of punishment and the moral authority of criminal law often 
provide such reasons.  Without those, most of us would succumb to our 
weaknesses when overcome by strong passions (infatuation, despair, jealousy) or 
temptations (of wealth, fame, power).  So, if, following Dressler, we were to agree 
that our fallibility is a sufficient moral ground for the defense of duress, should we 
not also provide defenses for those other instances of fallibility?  But if we do not 
think that violating the rights of others under the influence of passions or 
temptations deserves exculpation, it is less than clear to me why doing the same 
under the influence of fear does deserve it. 
The second problem is line-drawing.  For Dressler, the condition of no-fair-
opportunity may arise from both human and non-human threats110 and duress is 
available as a defense in prosecution for any offense, which, naturally, 
significantly enlarges the scope of potentially excusable situations.111  Dressler 
                                                                                                                                      
107 Id. at 710 (conceding that, as a defense of no-fair-opportunity, duress “raises troubling 
questions of legitimacy”). 
108 Id. at 711. 
109 Exegesis of the Law of Duress, supra note 1, at 1366 (footnote omitted). 
110 Id. at 1374–76. 
111 I am sympathetic to opening the defense to those who were forced to commit a crime by 
coercive circumstances, not only other individuals.  I also agree with Dressler’s critique of the MPC 
explanation of why duress is available only as a defense to a human threat.  According to the MPC 
drafters, the “significant difference” between excusing the two classes of cases is that in the case of 
human threats “the basic interests of the law may be satisfied by prosecution of the agent of unlawful 
force,” whereas with natural threats, “if the actor is excused, no one is subject to the law's 
application.”  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(3) cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985).  To that Dressler correctly responds: “But why should it be the case that before the 
criminal law excuses a person there must exist another actor with a wrongful will who potentially can 
be punished for the wrongdoing?  Certainly, as a descriptive matter, this claim is inconsistent with 
other excuses.”  Exegesis of the Law of Duress, supra note 1, at 1376. 
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recognizes that, pursuant to his theory, “[s]ome, but not all, persons who are forced 
into a corner and wrongfully choose to harm innocent persons rather than accept 
the threatened consequences will be excused.”112  But is there a principled way to 
draw the line between those who deserve to be excused and those who do not?  
Consider some scenarios. 
 
1. Through no fault of his, Derek finds himself in a situation in which he 
is threatened with violence unless within a short period of time he 
pays back a significant debt.  He has no realistic chances of escaping, 
receiving protection from the police, or obtaining the money lawfully.  
So, should Derek be excused if, in desperation, he: (i) burglarizes a 
grocery store; (ii) forces his little sister to prostitute herself; or (iii) 
kidnaps a child from a wealthy family for ransom? 
2. Alfred is in desperate need of a significant amount of money for his 
life-saving surgery.  Through no fault of his, Alfred has no 
opportunity to obtain the money lawfully.  Should he be excused if he 
does the same things as Derek in order to obtain the money? 
3. Rita is in desperate need of an urgent kidney transplant.  Rita knows 
that her half-sister Marina would be an ideal organ donor, but Marina 
refuses to donate her kidney.  Should Rita be excused if she arranged 
for Marina’s kidnapping and a forcible removal of Marina’s kidney? 
 
Unfortunately, Dressler’s theory gives us no tools for answering these 
questions.  Neither the general principle that “society does not and should not 
expect impossible; indeed, it should not always expect even the possible”113 nor the 
recognition of human fallibility helps us in distinguishing between these scenarios.  
In all of them, the defendants face a credible threat (human or non-human) of death 
or serious bodily harm; lack a fair opportunity to escape that threat without 
breaking the law; and succumb to their weaknesses.  Should all of them be 
excused?  Should none? 
Dressler seems to put his reliance in the jury’s ability to sort out the facts of 
each particular case.  He writes: 
 
Justification defenses amend the law; excuses provide justice to the 
individual who violated it.  In general, it is proper for legislatures to 
define justifications, but juries are better suited to determine desert of 
punishment in particular cases, especially when the issue is whether an 
actor has lived up to society’s legitimate expectations of moral 
courage.114 
 
                                                                                                                                      
112 Exegesis of the Law of Duress, supra note 1, at 1367. 
113 Id. at 1366. 
114 Id. at 1374 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
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The quote above raises many interesting questions, but I will address just 
one—that juries should have the freedom to “legislate” excuses.  This idea appears 
to be an important element in Dressler’s vision of how the defense of duress should 
operate.  But if we were willing to delegate this authority to the jury, why would 
we even bother distinguishing between different kinds of excuses?  Wouldn’t it be 
better, following Dressler’s logic, simply to instruct the jurors that they may 
excuse the defendant for any reason if they found that he has lived up to society’s 
legitimate expectations?  I doubt that it would be a good idea though.  Not only 
would such practice be pregnant with inconsistent verdicts and discrimination 
against the least powerful groups, but it would also be unfair in the most profound 
way—if people are not given advance notice of what conduct society excuses, they 
cannot be sure of how to avoid breaking the law. 
I do not mean to trivialize the problem of defining the boundaries of duress or 
criticize Dressler for an imperfect solution.  The problem is systemic: if duress is a 
complete excuse not rooted in complete incapacity, it is practically impossible to 
draw a principled line between the self-preferential harmful conduct that is 
permissible and that is not. 
 
III. DURESS AS A PARTIAL DEFENSE 
 
What could be an alternative theory of duress?  Let’s go back to my earlier 
suggestion that the defense of duress combines elements of justification and 
excuse.  Duress does not entirely eliminate either the actor’s responsibility or the 
act’s wrongfulness—it only reduces them.  Like provocation and excessive self-
defense, duress is best understood as an imperfect justification and imperfect 
excuse. 
The excusatory component all these defenses share is a temporary volitional 
impairment resulting in the reduced power to act in accordance with one’s long-
term goals and values.  The justificatory component, as I said before, lies primarily 
in the responsive nature of duress.  The inflicted harm is not the defendant’s 
“project”; someone else forced that project upon the defendant.  To a degree, the 
defendant may be compared to a person used by another as an “innocent 
instrumentality.”  Both under the common law and the MPC, all the responsibility 
for the harm inflicted by an “innocent instrumentality” falls on the perpetrator who 
causes that person to act criminally.115  Of course, the coerced defendant is not a 
completely “innocent instrumentality”; at best, he is a “partially innocent 
instrumentality.”  Only with respect to that part, he is justified. 
Shall the combination of two partial defenses—partial justification and partial 
excuse—produce a complete defense of duress?  I do not think so, at least not from 
                                                                                                                                      
115 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985) (“A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when[,] acting 
with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent 
or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct”). 
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the perspective of just desert.  Like the actors in the cases of excessive self-defense 
and provocation, the coerced actor does not deserve a complete defense because he 
was a moral agent (he did not lack the capacity to make the moral choice) who 
exceeded the limits of his rights and produced an overall regrettable balance of 
harms and evils. 
The responsive anger of a provoked actor may be warranted and 
understandable, and the responsibility for his harmful outburst may be partially 
imposed on his provoker,116 and yet the actor is not entirely exculpated.  His 
actions are still regrettable, and he does not completely lack the volitional capacity 
to escape the blame.  Similarly, the fear of a coerced actor may be warranted and 
understandable and the responsibility for the harm he caused in compliance with 
the coercive demand may be partially imposed on his coercer, and yet—for the 
same reasons as in the case of provocation—the actor does not deserve a complete 
exculpation.117 
The doctrine of imperfect self-defense operates in a similar fashion.  Where 
this doctrine is recognized, the actor who used excessive force in self-defense and 
killed his attacker is not completely exonerated but the killing is mitigated from 
murder to manslaughter.118  Likewise, a few U.S. jurisdictions mitigate murder to 
manslaughter in cases of duress.119  By analogy with the imperfect self-defense, 
                                                                                                                                      
116 For more detailed discussion of similarities and distinctions between duress and 
provocation, see Jeremy Horder, Autonomy, Provocation and Duress, in 1992 CRIM. L. REV. 706–15 
(1992). 
117 Dressler recognizes similarities between provocation and duress.  However, he believes that 
these defenses are rooted in different theories of excuse—unlike the no-fair-opportunity basis for 
duress, the basis for provocation is the defendant’s “partial-loss-of-capacity-for-self-control.”  
Dressler explains: 
In duress cases, we sense that the coerced party chooses to accede to the coercer’s threat; 
it is in a real sense a rational, albeit perhaps socially unjustifiable, choice. . . .  [W]ith 
provocation, the killing is the result of an emotional explosion almost immediately 
following the provocation.  The homicidal act here is the antithesis of rationality. 
Provocation Defense, supra note 91, at 975 n.68.  This explanation raises questions.  If a provoked 
act is truly irrational, why is it only partially excused?  And if a coerced act is in a real sense a 
rational choice, why is it excused completely?  If provocation and duress were merely excuses, the 
allocation of punishment between the two should have been the reverse: a wrongdoer with a limited 
capacity deserves a lesser punishment than a wrongdoer with full capacities.  Even assuming the 
theory of no-fair-opportunity could adequately explain duress, why does no-fair-opportunity impede 
free choice more than partial-loss-of-capacity-for-self-control?  Dressler’s theory does not explain 
that. 
118 State v. Faulkner, 483 A.2d 759, 761 (Md. 1984). 
119 See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:2-9 (2013) (mitigating killing to manslaughter); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. § 13-1103 (2018) (same); MINN. STAT. § 609.20(3) (2017) (mitigating killing to manslaughter 
in the first degree); WIS. STAT. § 939.46(1) (2017) (mitigating killing to 2nd-degree intentional 
homicide). 
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duress (particularly when expanded to include non-human threats) may be 
conceptualized as imperfect necessity.120 
Duress and necessity are based on very similar principles (and often are 
confused by judges and commentators alike).121  Both require: an objective, 
external threat to some vital interests of the actor or others that can be avoided only 
by breaking the law; an actor who is not at fault in finding himself in that situation; 
and the subjectively honest (plus, under most laws, objectively reasonable) belief 
of the actor in the necessity to break the law in order to avoid the harm.122  The 
biggest difference between the two defenses is in the “balance of evils”: unlike 
necessity, duress is not foreclosed to the coerced actor who consciously chose to, 
and in fact did, bring about the same or more significant harm than that with which 
he was threatened.123  The “imperfection” of duress, just like that of excessive self-
defense, is in the negative balance of evils.  And just like excessive self-defense is 
only a partial defense, so should be duress. 
Courts in the United Kingdom have discussed extensively the illogical and 
controversial application of the defense of duress.124  How can it be a complete 
defense to any crime other than homicide,125 and no defense at all to homicide?126  
As an alternative of making duress a complete defense to homicide, some judges 
thought it more appropriate to allow duress as a partial defense.  In R v. Gotts, for 
example, Lord Lowry argued: 
 
                                                                                                                                      
120 In the same spirit, Kyron Huigens has suggested that one way to look at duress may be 
through the lens of “mistaken” justification.  See Huigens, supra note 30, at 312 (critiquing Westen & 
Mangiafico, supra note 30). 
121 See, e.g., United States v. LaFleur, 971 F.2d 200, 205 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 507 
U.S. 924 (1993) (including a balance of harms element in duress); LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 30 at 
433 (requiring that defendant’s choice to break the law in order to avoid the threat be the lesser harm 
under the circumstances).  LaFave’s work has been often cited by courts; however, in later editions of 
the treatise the requirement of the lesser evil has been removed.  See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 73–74 (2nd ed. 2003) (describing MPC approach, which eliminates the 
“balance of harms” element for duress, as the majority approach). 
122 See, e.g., KADISH, SCHULHOFER & BARKOW, supra note 36, at 993–94. 
123 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985). 
124 See, e.g., R v. Gotts [1992] 2 AC 412 (HL) (Lord Jauncey); R v. Howe [1987] AC 417 
(HL) (Lord Hailsham) (UK); Abbott v. The Queen [1976] 3 WLR 462 (PC) (Lord Salmon); D.P.P. 
for Northern Ireland v. Lynch [1975] AC 653 (HL); R v. Kray [1970] 1 Q.B. 125 (Lord Widgery); R 
v Brown [1968] SASR 467 (Austrl.). 
125 Under common law, duress was also not available as a defense to treason.  See, e.g., R v. 
Gotts [1992] 2 AC 412 (HL) 420 (Lord Jauncey) (observing that, under common law, treason and 
murder were the only crimes to which duress was not a defense). 
126 See R v. Howe [1987] AC 417 (HL) 438  (Lord Brandon)  (UK) (“It is not logical, and I do 
not think it can be just, that duress should afford a complete defence to charges of all crimes less 
grave than murder, but not even a partial defence to a charge of that crime”). 
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[T]he defence of duress, as a general defence available at common law 
which is sufficient to negative the criminal liability of a defendant 
against whom every ingredient of an offence has otherwise been proved, 
is difficult to rationalise or explain by reference to any coherent 
principle of jurisprudence.  The theory that the party acting under duress 
is so far deprived of volition as to lack the necessary criminal intent has 
been clearly shown to be fallacious . . . . No alternative theory seems to 
provide a wholly satisfactory foundation on which the defence can rest.  
The law, therefore, might have developed more logically had it adopted 
the view of Stephen, expressed in his History of the Criminal Law of 
England . . . that duress should be a matter, not of defence, but of 
mitigation.  If this course had been followed, it might sensibly have led 
to the further development that, in the case of murder, duress, like 
provocation, would have sufficed to reduce the offence from murder to 
manslaughter.127 
 
Following the same logic, in Abbot v. The Queen, Lord Salmon opined: 
 
There is much to be said for the view that on a charge of murder, duress, 
like provocation, should not entitle the accused to a clean acquittal but 
should reduce murder to manslaughter and thus give the court power to 
pass whatever sentence might be appropriate in all the circumstances of 
the case.128 
 
At least some U.S. courts made similar observations.  In Wentworth v. 
State,129 for example, the court observed: 
 
One who is coerced by another person, or forced by the pressure of 
natural physical circumstances (e.g., thirst, starvation) into committing 
what is otherwise a crime, may have in some circumstances a complete 
defense to the crime, but not if the crime in question consists of 
intentionally killing another human being.  Thus one who, not in self-
defense or defense of another, kills an innocent third person to save 
himself or to save another is guilty of a crime.  But it is arguable that his 
                                                                                                                                      
127 R v. Gotts [1992] 2 AC 412 (HL) 430–31 (Lord Lowry, dissenting) (citations omitted).  See 
also R v. Howe [1987] AC 417  (HL) 439 (Lord Griffiths) (UK) (opining that “it would have been 
better had [duress] . . . been regarded as a factor to be taken into account in mitigation as Stephen 
suggested in his History of the Criminal Law of England”); 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY 
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 107 (London, MacMillan & Co. 1883) (“No doubt the moral 
guilt of a person who commits a crime under compulsion is less than that of a person who commits it 
freely, but any effect which is thought proper may be given to this circumstance by a proportional 
mitigation of the offender’s punishment.”). 
128 Abbott v. The Queen [1976] 3 WLR 462 (PC) 471 (Lord Salmon). 
129 349 A.2d 421 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975). 
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crime should be manslaughter rather than murder, on the theory that the 
pressure upon him, although not enough to justify his act, should serve at 
least to mitigate it to something less than murder.130 
 
I agree with the arguments above that the doctrine of duress should be 
available in prosecution for any crime, including homicide.  However, the illogical 
application of the defense to different offenses will not be cured if duress be a 
partial defense to homicide and a complete defense to all other offenses.  Very 
soon, courts will be struggling again with the questions they so unhappily tried to 
resolve in recent decades: what should be the effect of duress in the cases of 
attempted homicide; conspiracy to commit homicide; and aiding and abetting in 
homicide?  Other painful questions would include distinguishing between 
homicide-related offenses and, say, severe torture or brutal rape, endangering the 
life of the victim but not resulting in the victim’s death. 
A much more principled solution would be to treat duress as a partial defense 
to all offenses.  After all, duress has independent significance only when the actor 
inflicts on another a serious bodily harm that is equal to or higher in gravity than 
the very serious bodily harm with which the actor has been threatened—in other 
words, the defense of duress is always a defense to severe crimes of violence.  
There is no reason to treat those crimes categorically differently from homicide.  If 
duress should only partially exculpate murder, it should also be only a partial 
defense to torture, rape, and serious battery. 
 
IV. THE OPERATION OF THE DEFENSE OF DURESS 
 
Assuming I have succeeded in my argument that duress should be a partial 
defense only, the next question is whether this separate defense is even needed.  As 
a partial defense combining elements of justification and excuse, duress 
conceptually represents a subspecies of an already existing defense, the MPC 
version of provocation, namely the extreme mental or emotional disturbance for 
which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse (“EMED”).131  True, EMED is 
an offense-specific defense; it applies only to homicide.  Elsewhere, I have argued 
that provocation, including its EMED version, should be a general partial 
defense.132  It is very strange indeed that criminal law grants a partial defense to a 
killer provoked by a victim; yet, if the reasonably outraged actor, instead of 
shooting, slapped the victim on his face (assault) or threw a valuable vase on the 
floor (criminal mischief), there would be no similar mitigation in most U.S. 
jurisdictions.  It is hard to justify a rule that allows mitigation for a graver crime 
                                                                                                                                      
130 Id. at 427–28 (quoting LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 30, at 585). 
131 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1985). 
132 Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 92, at 432–36. 
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but denies it for a lesser crime.  As a matter of both logic and public policy, such 
rule makes very little sense.133 
If this aberration is to be corrected and EMED be properly recognized as a 
general partial defense, it would subsume the defense of duress.  Indeed, what 
mental or emotional disturbance has a more reasonable (and powerful) explanation 
than a realistic threat of death or serious bodily harm?  And why would we need a 
separate defense of duress if it has the same elements and effect as the more 
general defense of EMED?134 
Naturally, when the circumstances of the case warrant other defenses too, the 
existence of the defense of EMED should not preclude such other defenses, 
including those that may result in a complete exoneration.  Among such other 
defenses may be: necessity (when the harms caused by the coerced actor are lesser 
than the harms avoided); all excuses of complete incapacity; diminished capacity 
(when the coerced actor lacked the capacity to form the required mens rea); and the 
failure of proof argument of the lack of actus reus (e.g., when the coerced actor 
prosecuted for culpable omission lacked the capacity to move). 
Whether lawmakers agree to treat duress as a subspecies of EMED or retain 
duress as an independent defense is not as important to me as establishing that 
duress ought to be a partial defense only.  Thus understood, the claim of duress, 
including duress by circumstances, should be allowed in prosecution for any 
offense to mitigate the gravity of the offense—for example, reduce aggravated 
assault to assault; murder to manslaughter; or a felony of the first degree to a 
felony of a lesser degree.  In addition, considerations of duress should be taken into 
account during sentencing.135 
To determine whether the defendant deserves conviction of a lesser offense, 
the factfinder should first determine whether the criminal act was committed while 
the actor suffered from a severe volitional impairment due to duress; this is a 
threshold question.  If this threshold is passed, the factfinder should consider the 
justificatory factors, including those listed in Part I(C) above.  For example, in the 
                                                                                                                                      
133 See id. at 435. 
134 Today too, courts often include fear induced by a threat of violence in the list of the 
emotional conditions that may trigger the defense of provocation.  For example, in Minor v. State, 
No. CACR 02-672, 2003 WL 1300873, at *5 (Ark. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2003), the appellate court 
found that the defendant was entitled to the provocation jury instruction where the victim had 
previously threatened the defendant, twice with a gun, and, on the day of the killing, the victim 
reached into his pocket, and ran after the defendant while cursing and threatening to kill him.  See 
also Rainey v. State, 837 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Ark. 1992) (opining that, in combination with adequate 
provocation, the “passion that will reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter may consist of 
anger or sudden resentment, or of fear or terror”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
135 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.12 (2016) (authorizing 
downward departure from the Guidelines range when defendant acted under “serious coercion, 
blackmail or duress, under circumstances not amounting to a complete defense”).  See also United 
States v. Amor, 24 F.3d 432, 438 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming downward departure where the district 
court found that the defendant would not have purchased and altered the firearm but for the threats he 
received and the shots fired at his vehicle). 
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case of Topcu and Papadopoulos discussed in the beginning of this article, the jury 
could consider: 
 
(i)  the heinousness of the rape committed by the defendants;  
(ii)   the gap between the violence with which they were threatened and 
the harm of forcible rape suffered by the victim;  
(iii) whether the victim would have been raped by someone else if the 
defendants refused to do that;  
(iv) the defendants’ respective roles in the crime;  
(v)  the fact that Topcu merely allowed the nonconsensual fellatio to be 
performed on him whereas Papadopoulos was much more actively 
involved in the nonconsensual intercourse;  
(vi) the defendants’ claim that they were afraid not only for themselves 
but also for the victim and that the fear for her motivated them to do 
whatever Eken requested;  
(vii) whether they had any conflicting duties; and  
(viii) the fact that they acted intentionally. 
 
It is likely that the defendants would have been convicted upon the jury’s 
consideration of these factors too, but it would have been a much more nuanced 
and morally reasoned decision. 
The lesser the wrongfulness of the coerced actor’s conduct, the stronger his 
claim of duress, and the lesser should be his offense and punishment.  What is 
important in any case, however, is for the court to recognize that the actor bears 
responsibility for what he did.  Society should respect its citizens, both victims and 
perpetrators, and it should show that respect by siding with the victims who have 
suffered and by treating the perpetrators as responsible moral agents capable of 




I had two reasons for writing this article.  One is many years of my admiration 
for Joshua Dressler and his scholarship; the other has to do with my personal 
background.  The first is obvious to anyone who has ever met Dressler or read his 
work; the second I ought to explain. 
I have never met my maternal grandmother; she was gone years before I was 
born.  In 1950, she was executed, one of many innocent victims of Stalin’s 
terror.136  In recent years, the official line of Russian historiography and 
                                                                                                                                      
136 For information about my grandmother Mirra Zheleznova, see, e.g., STALIN’S SECRET 
POGROM: THE POSTWAR INQUISITION OF THE JEWISH ANTI-FASCIST COMMITTEE (Joshua Rubenstein & 
Vladimir P. Naumov eds., Laura Esther Wolfson trans., 2001); НАДЕЖДА ЖЕЛЕЗНОВА-БЕРГЕЛЬСОН, 
МОЮ МАМУ УБИЛИ В СЕРЕДИНЕ ХХ [NADEZHDA ZHELEZNOVA-BERGELSON, MY MOTHER WAS 
MURDERED IN THE MIDDLE OF THE 20TH CENTURY (2014)]. 
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intellectual discourse close to the Russian government has been that, in those 
“difficult” times, everyone was a victim, both the executioner and the executed.137  
The sense of fear was so prevalent and overpowering that people did whatever was 
asked of them: fabricated false accusations against their neighbors and coworkers; 
tortured the accused; convicted and killed the innocent.  All in all, there was no 
meaningful difference between the victim and the victimizer.  Fear explains and 
exculpates everything. 
I agree, fear is a very powerful emotion, we all know that.  It does explain 
many wrongdoings, but in my mind, it should not exculpate them.  That belief was 
the second reason for my decision to explore the defense of duress—the ultimate 
defense of fear. 
It is impossible today to think about duress without paying close attention to 
Dressler’s work on the subject.  Not only did he analyze the meaning and 
boundaries of this defense; confronted head-on the problems of its moral 
legitimacy; and cleared numerous conceptual confusions.  He also set the field for 
future scholarship and invited scholars and lawmakers to study the moral questions 
presented by duress with the hope that, if they do so, “the law may ultimately make 
more sense and more closely correlate with our moral intuitions.”138  On top of 
that, Dressler raised a question that goes far beyond the scope of duress—the 
question of people’s capacity for moral choices, and he did that with breathtaking 
humility.  He wrote: 
 
There is another, more compelling reason to think about duress.  An 
honest view of coercion teaches or reminds us that countless ordinary 
people, like ourselves, have weaknesses and susceptibilities that allow us 
to contribute to the world’s injustices and cruelty.  That we are human 
really means, at times, that we are all too human.  It is not as easy as we 
sometimes think to “plac[e] the greatest distance between us and 
responsibility for evil.”  Perhaps there are fewer moral monsters in this 
world than “ordinary men [who] . . . do monstrous things.”139 
 
This is a powerful moral argument—but this is an argument for forgiveness, 
not for non-responsibility.140  The difference is important: unlike forgiveness, 
which does not have to (or indeed cannot)141 be deserved, a claim of non-
                                                                                                                                      
137 See Лев Аннинский, Палачи и жертвы [Lev Anninskiy, Executioners and Victims] 
(June 5, 2017), https://rg.ru/2017/06/05/rodina-palachi-i-zhertvy.html [https://perma.cc/F6FV-
EACH] (discussing, among other things, how victimizers would later become victims and wondering 
whether there was a clear line between the two groups). 
138 Exegesis of the Law of Duress, supra note 1, at 1386. 
139 Id. (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).  
140 See, e.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness, Reconciliation and Responding to Evil: A 
Philosophical Overview, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1353, 1355–56 (2000) (discussing the difference 
between justifications, excuses, and forgiveness). 
141 See Leo Zaibert, The Paradox of Forgiveness, 6 J. MORAL PHIL. 365 (2009). 
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responsibility is desert-based.  A person who begs for forgiveness admits 
responsibility for doing “monstrous things” and only asks not to be punished as he 
deserves.  And we may have good reasons to forgive someone who deserves 
punishment and forego some or all of the punishment.  A person who claims non-
responsibility does not have to beg.  Duress is an affirmative defense, a defense of 
right: the actor who satisfies its requirements is entitled to it. 
As I was going through Dressler’s arguments, questioning my own intuitions, 
and reading numerous cases involving claims of duress, I was thinking about all 
those who, like my grandmother, were falsely accused, tortured, and murdered, and 
all those who falsely accused, tortured, and murdered them—and later denied 
responsibility for what they did because they did all that out of fear.  If Dressler is 
right and duress is an excuse and a complete defense, all those reasonably scared 
people may be correct: perhaps they did not have a “fair opportunity” not to harm 
the innocent.  If I am right, and duress is a partial defense, which combines 
elements of justification and excuse, society should hold those people responsible.  
They may not all be “monsters,” but moral agents who do “monstrous things” at 
the very least deserve criminal indictment, trial, and conviction.  I think I am right: 
it is critical for a just society to recognize and enforce the rule that fear does not 
exculpate intentional wrongdoings against innocent people.  Duress is no excuse. 
